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We analyze a general search model with on-the-job search and sorting of heterogeneous 
workers into heterogeneous jobs. This model yields a simple relationship between (i) the 
unemployment rate, (ii) the value of non-market time, and (iii) the max-mean wage 
differential. The latter measure of wage dispersion is more robust than measures based on the 
reservation wage, due to the long left tail of the wage distribution. We estimate this wage 
differential using data on match quality and allow for measurement error. The estimated wage 
dispersion and mismatch for the US is consistent with an unemployment rate of 4-6%. We 
find that without search frictions, output would be between 7.5% and 18.5% higher, 
depending on whether or not firms can ex ante commit to wage payments. 
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Relative to a competitive economy, an economy with search frictions generates less output
because (i) there are idle resources like unemployed workers, (ii) resources are spent on
recruitment activities, and (iii) the assignment of workers to jobs is sub-optimal. Het-
erogeneity is crucial when assessing the importance of search frictions. If all unemployed
workers and jobs were alike, it would be hard to imagine why it would take workers
months to ﬁnd a good match. The more important the quality of the match, the costlier
are search frictions.
This paper analyses a class of search models with on-the-job search (OJS) and hetero-
geneity among workers and jobs. As a starting point, we take the framework of Gautier,
Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2010) where the productivity of a match is decreasing in the
distance between worker and job type and where employed workers continue moving to-
wards the most productive jobs. We use a production technology that can be interpreted
as a second order Taylor approximation of a more general production function. Within
this framework, various wage mechanisms can be analyzed like wage posting with full
commitment as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and wage mechanisms without com-
mitment as in Coles (2001) and Shimer (2006). The key diﬀerence between wage setting
with and without commitment is that in the ﬁrst case, ﬁrms pay both hiring and no quit
premia to hire/ keep workers whereas in the latter case, the only reason for ﬁrms to pay
workers above their reservation wage is to prevent them from quitting. The equilibrium
is characterized by a relationship between just three statistics: (i) the unemployment
rate, (ii) the value of non-market time, and (iii) a summary statistic for wage dispersion
between identical workers, the max-mean wage diﬀerential. We show that this statistic
is more informative and more robust than alternatives like the ratio of the mean wage to
the reservation wage (i.e. the mean-min ratio of Hornstein, Krusell and Violante, 2010).
This relation hardly depends on any of the model’s parameters, except for the relative
eﬃciency of on- versus oﬀ-the-job search, ψ. For the calculation of the total output loss
due to search frictions for a given unemployment rate, even the eﬀect of ψ is a higher
order phenomenon.
The combination of two-sided heterogeneity and search frictions relates our model
to the literature on hedonic pricing in the spirit of Rosen (1974), Sattinger (1975) and
Teulings (1995,2005). These models are hierarchical, in the sense that better skilled
workers have a comparative advantage in more complex jobs. Hence, there is a least and
2a best skilled worker, and there is a least and most complex job type. In a Walrasian
equilibrium, there is perfect sorting. With search frictions, this perfect correlation between
worker and job types breaks down, since workers cannot aﬀord to wait for ever till the
optimal match comes along. Shimer and Smith (2000) and Teulings and Gautier (2004)
are early examples of assignment models with search frictions. Hierarchical models are
diﬃcult to solve because matching sets in the corners of the type space do not have interior
boundaries. We therefore ﬁrst transform the hierarchical model into a circular model in
the spirit of Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2008).
The idea is that proﬁts are decreasing in the distance between worker and job types. This
makes it possible to derive a closed form solution of the equilibrium. When turning to
the empirical analysis of data on individual wages, and on worker and job characteristics,
we reintroduce the hierarchical aspect of the model.
Ultimately, the usefulness of our model depends on how well it can simultaneously
describe the observed wage dispersion due to mismatch, the unemployment rate, and the
ratio of job-to-job versus unemployment-to-job worker ﬂows. We show that the equilib-
rium unemployment rate in our model that is consistent with the observed amount of wage
dispersion is between 4% and 6% which seems reasonable. Given that our model performs
well, we can calculate the total output loss due to search frictions which is between 8%
and 12% if ﬁrms can commit to wage payments, and between 14.5% and 18.5% if they
cannot. The majority of the output loss is due to recruitment activities and mismatch.
Hornstein et.al. (2010) also derive a simple relationship between the unemployment
rate and wage dispersion that holds for a large class of search models. They argue that
search models without OJS cannot explain the coexistence of low unemployment rates
and substantial wage dispersion because the ﬁrst suggests low frictions and the latter
suggests high frictions. Gautier and Teulings (2006) made the related point that without
OJS, estimates of output losses due to search frictions based on the unemployment rate
are substantially lower than estimates based on wage dispersion. Allowing for OJS and
unobserved heterogeneity can resolve this issue. OJS lowers the reservation wage which
increases wage dispersion for a given unemployment rate. As in Hornstein et al. (2010)
this requires a suﬃciently large contact rate for employed workers.
. Similarly, Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) construct a measure based on the distance
between the lowest and highest wage. One disadvantage of relating wage dispersion to
the lowest observed wage (see also the mean-min ratio of Hornstein et.al.,2010) is that
3the wage distribution for a given skill type has a long left tail. This long tail is consistent
with OJS for the reasons spelled out in Burdett and Mortensen (1998): (i) OJS reduces
the lowest acceptable job type because less option value of continued search has to be
given up when accepting a job, and (ii) less workers quit from good matches and more
workers accept good matches. Empirically, it matters a lot whether one takes the 1th or
the 2nd percentile of the wage distribution as a proxy for the reservation wage. Therefore,
the diﬀerence between the highest wage at the optimal assignment and the mean wage
(the max-mean diﬀerential) is a more robust measure for wage dispersion.
When on- and oﬀ-the-job search are equally eﬃcient and when the well known conges-
tion eﬀects of opening vacancies are switched oﬀ (i.e. by a quadratic contact technology),
the equilibrium where ﬁrms are able to commit to their posted wages is constrained ef-
ﬁcient. In the equilibrium where ﬁrms are unable to commit, quasi-rents per worker are
higher than in the social optimum due to a business-stealing externality. Under free entry,
these quasi-rents are spent on (excess) vacancy creation, see Gautier, Teulings and van
Vuuren (2010). We estimate the output loss due to this business externality to be up to
6% (if no ﬁrm commits).
The empirical estimate of the max-mean wage diﬀerential for identical workers in het-
erogeneous jobs is an extension of the framework of Gautier and Teulings (2006) with
OJS. Our estimate is based on the intercept of a simple quadratic wage regression with
appropriately normalized measures for worker and job characteristics. This type of infer-
ence is highly sensitive to measurement error in both characteristics because an observed
sub-optimal matched worker can either reﬂect true mismatch, or simply imply measure-
ment error. Our estimation procedure accounts for this problem. Gautier and Teulings
(2006) use second order terms in worker and job characteristics to capture the concavity
of wages around the optimal assignment that is implied by search models with sorting.
However, there is a crucial diﬀerence between a model with and without OJS. In a model
without OJS, wages are a linear transformation of the match surplus. Since the match
surplus is a diﬀerentiable function of the match quality indicator, so is the wage function.
This simple relation no longer applies with OJS, see Shimer (2006). The wage function
turns out to be non-diﬀerentiable at the optimal assignment. At that point, ﬁrms are
prepared to pay the highest premiums to raise hiring and to reduce quitting. In our em-
pirical application, we take this into account. Allowing for OJS is important since Fallick
and Fleischman (2004) and Nagypal (2005) show that job-to-job ﬂows are substantial.
4Lise, Meghir and Robin (2008) and Lopes de Melo (2008) also look at sorting in models
with OJS. Their focus is on interpreting the correlations between worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects and how this relates to complementarities between worker and job types in the
production technology. Finally, Eeckhout and Kircher (2009) consider a simple model
based on Atakan (2006) where workers and jobs are randomly matched and have the
option to dissolve and at some cost move to a competitive sector with perfect sorting.
They derive a similar hump shaped relation where productivity is highest at the optimal
assignment and decreases in the distance from this optimal assignment. This framework
is however less suitable to bring to the data.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
framework. Section 3 discusses the basic steps in our argument. In this section, we also
reinstall the hierarchical features of the model and derive the wage function that comes
with it. We also show how we can normalize worker and job skills such that we can relate
the constant in a simple wage regression to the max-mean wage diﬀerential. Finally,
section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Why a circular model?
Shimer and Smith (2000) and Teulings and Gautier (2004) analyze an assignment model
with search frictions and without OJS. Though the idea is straightforward, the analysis
is complicated. Figure 1 provides an intuition for why this is the case. The ﬁgure shows
the space of potential matches between skill types, s, and worker types, c. The Walrasian
equilibrium assignment is depicted by the main diagonal. Comparative advantage of
skilled workers in complex jobs implies that it is upward sloping. Perfect sorting implies
that it is a one-to-one correspondence. Search frictions and suﬃcient complementarities
between worker and job types imply that the equilibrium assignment is a set rather than
a point where x measures the distance of worker type s to her optimal assignment. Away
from the corners, the optimal match is in the middle of the matching set while close to
the corners, the optimal assignment is close to the boundary. Teulings and Gautier (2004)
who do not allow for OJS use Taylor expansions for the middle part and show that for
small search frictions and if worker and job types are normally distributed, the corner







Figure 1: The hierarchical versus the circular model
and Van Vuuren (2005) show that by taking out the hierarchical aspect of the model,
the south-west and the north-east corner of the matching space can be "glued" together.
Then, a circular model in the spirit of Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) can be used, see
the lower part of Figure 1. The distance x to the optimal assignment is now measured
along the circumference of the circle. All conclusions from the analysis of the hierarchical
model without OJS in Teulings and Gautier (2004) based on Taylor expansions carry
over to the circular model. The intuition for this is that if there is relatively little mass
around the corners, all that matters for productivity is the distance to the optimal job.
We follow this idea in this paper, but now for a model with OJS. First, we take out the
hierarchical feature and provide a closed form analysis of a search equilibrium with sorting
in the context of the circular model. Then, we reintroduce the hierarchical aspect for the
empirical analysis of wage diﬀerentials, using data with information on worker and job
characteristics, which are hierarchical by nature.
The interpretation of the circular search model as an approximation of the hierarchical
model has an important implication for the production structure. Figure 2 depicts Rosen’s
hedonic equilibrium in the wage-skill space. The upper panel is the Walrasian case. The
upward sloping line is the market wage for a worker with skill type s, the oﬀer curves
represent the value of output in jobs with a particular level of complexity c when occupied
by worker types with diﬀerent skill types. The point of tangency is the optimal assignment,
the only assignment that is relevant in the Walrasian case. The lower panel is the case














Figure 2: Rosen’s oﬀer curves and the shape of matching sets
All values of s enveloped by this reservation wage and the oﬀer curve are now part of the
matching set of that job type. Taking out the hierarchical aspect of the model implies
that the (reservation) wage function becomes horizontal. What is crucial is that these
functions keep their shape by this operation. Hence, these functions are diﬀerentiable in
their maximum. We impose this feature in the theoretical model.
2.2 Assumptions
Production
There is a continuum of worker types s and job types c; s and c are locations on a circle.
Workers can only produce output when matched to a job. The productivity of a match
of worker type s to job type c depends on the "distance" |x| between s and c along the
circumference of the circle, where x is deﬁned as x ≡ s−c. Y (x) has an interior maximum
at x = 0; it is symmetric around this maximum, which is normalized to unity: Y (0) = 1;
Y (x) is twice diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. We consider the simplest functional
form that meets these criteria:





x is the mismatch indicator. The parameter γ determines the cost of sub-optimal as-
signment. Y (x) can be interpreted as a second order Taylor approximation around the
optimal assignment of a more general production technology. Since, the ﬁrst derivative of
7a continuous production function equals zero in the optimal assignment, Y ′ (0) = 0, the
ﬁrst order term drops out. We are interested in equilibria where unemployed job seekers
do not accept all job oﬀers, which imposes a minimum constraint on γ.1
Labor supply and the value of non market time
Labor supply per s-type is uniformly distributed over the circumference of the circle.
Total labor supply in period t equals L(t). Unemployed workers receive the value of non
market time B. Employed workers supply a ﬁxed amount of labor (normalized to unity)
and their payoﬀ is equal to the wage they receive. Workers live for ever. They maximize
the discounted value of their expected lifetime payoﬀs.
Labor demand
There is free entry of vacancies for all c-types. The cost of maintaining a vacancy is equal
to K per period. After a vacancy is ﬁlled, the ﬁrm’s only cost is the worker’s wage. The
supply of vacancies is determined by a zero proﬁt condition: ﬁrms open new vacancies
up till the point where the discounted value of expected proﬁts is equal to the cost of
keeping that vacancy open. Vacancies are uniformly distributed over the circumference
of the circle; v(c) = v is the measure of vacancies per unit of c.
Job search technology
We use a reduced form speciﬁcation of the job search technology:
λ = λ(u,v),λv > 0,
and assume that the rate at which unemployed workers meet jobs is λ and the rate at
which employed workers meet jobs is ψλ. The exact functional form of this relation is
irrelevant for the analysis in this paper. E.g. our analysis applies irrespective of the
returns to scale. The parameter ψ,0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1, measures the relative eﬃciency of on-
relative to oﬀ-the-job search; ψ = 0 is the case without OJS, as analyzed in the stochastic
matching model of Pissarides (2000), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Teulings and
Gautier (2004); for ψ = 1, on- and oﬀ-the-job search are equally eﬃcient. When a worker
quits her old job to accept a new job, the old job disappears. Hence, she cannot return
to her previous job.
Job destruction
1A suﬃcient condition for this is that Y (x) < 0 for at least some x. Let C be the circumference of
the circle, then 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2C. Hence γ > 8C.
8Matches between workers and jobs are destroyed at an exogenous rate δ > 0.
Golden-growth path
We study the economy while it is on a golden-growth path, where the discount rate ρ > 0
is equal to the growth rate of the labor force. We normalize the labor force at t = 0 to one.
Hence, the size of the labor force is L(t) = exp(ρt). The assumption of a golden-growth
path buys us a lot in terms of transparency and tractability. The implications of the
golden growth assumptions are equivalent to those that follow from the assumption that
the discount rate ρ converges to zero, an assumption that is often applied in the wage
posting literature, see for example Burdett and Mortensen (1998) because discounting
reduces future output while population growth increases it. New workers enter the labor
force as unemployed.
Labor supply per worker type, the productivity in the optimal assignment Y (0) are all
normalized to one. Hence, in the absence of search frictions, the output of this economy
equals one.
Wage setting
Wages, denoted by W (x), are set unilaterally by the ﬁrm, conditional on the mismatch
indicator x in the current job. We analyze wage setting under two diﬀerent assumptions
on the ability of ﬁrms to commit to future wage payments. Under the ﬁrst assumption,
ﬁrms can commit to a future wage payment contingent on x. Then, ﬁrms pay both no-quit
and hiring premiums, that is, they account for the positive eﬀect of a higher wage oﬀer on
reduced quitting and increased hiring. Under the second assumption, ﬁrms are unable to
commit to future wage payments. In this case, hiring premiums are non-credible because
immediately after the worker has accepted the job, the ﬁrm has no incentive to continue
paying a hiring premium, since the worker cannot return to her previous job. Workers
anticipate this, and will therefore not respond to this premium in the ﬁrst place, and
hence, ﬁrms will not oﬀer it. No-quit premiums are credible even without commitment
because it is in the ﬁrm’s interest to pay them as soon as the worker has accepted the
job. Starting to pay a no-quit premium only when the worker gets an oﬀer is non-credible
again, because the ﬁrm has no incentive to continue paying the no-quit premium after
the worker has declined the oﬀer. Hence, the only way for the ﬁrm to gain credibility in
paying no-quit premiums is to pay these premiums right from the start.2
2See also Bontemps van den Berg and Robin (2000) for wage setting with and Coles (2001) and Shimer
92.3 The asset values of (un)employment and vacancies
The golden-growth assumption is particularly useful for the derivation of the asset values
of employment, unemployment, and vacancies.
Asset value of unemployment
In the appendix, we show that the asset value of unemployment, denoted by V U is a
weighted average of the worker’s payoﬀ while unemployed, B, and the expected wage
when employed, ExW, the weights being the unemployment and the employment rate,
respectively:
ρV
U = uB + (1 − u)ExW. (2)
Why does this relation take such a simple form? The reason is that the growth rate of the
workforce is equal to the worker’s discount rate. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ of a worker
with one year of experience is equal to the average payoﬀ of the cohort of workers that
entered the labor force one year ago. Likewise, the expected payoﬀ of a worker with two
years of experience is equal to the average payoﬀ of the cohort of workers that entered the
labor market two years ago, etc. The asset value of unemployment is equal to the weighted
sum of expected payoﬀs for each level of experience, future payoﬀs being discounted at a
rate ρ per year. This weighted sum is exactly equal to the sum of payoﬀs for the current
workforce. The fact that older cohorts are smaller than younger cohorts due to the growth
of the labor force at a rate ρ exactly oﬀsets the eﬀect of discounting future payoﬀs for the
calculation of the asset value of unemployment. The term (1 − u)ExW can be interpreted
as the option value of ﬁnding a job. Alternatively, when ρ → 0, workers spend a fraction
u of their life as unemployed and the rest of the time they are employed.
Asset value of employment in the marginal job
Let V E (x)be the asset value of holding a job with mismatch indicator x. At   x, an
unemployed job seeker is indiﬀerent between accepting the job or waiting for a better
oﬀer: V E (  x) = V U. Again, the asset value for this job is a weighted average of W (  x)
and ExW:
ρV
E (  x) =
uW (  x) + ψ(1 − u)ExW
u + ψ (1 − u)
, (3)
see Appendix A.1 for the derivation. The factor u + ψ(1 − u) is the eﬀective supply of
job seekers, namely u unemployed job seekers and (1 − u) employed job seekers, which
(2006) for wage setting without commitment.
10are discounted by a factor ψ due to their lower search eﬀectiveness. Hence, the weights
in equation (3) are the shares of unemployed and employed respectively in the eﬀective
supply. The intuition for this equation is that the option value of ﬁnding a better job is the
same as for an unemployed job seeker, since both an unemployed and a worker employed
in the marginal job type x =   x accept any job: 0 ≤ |x| <   x. However, the option value
of an employed worker is only a fraction ψ of the option value of an unemployed due to
their lower contact rate. At ﬁrst sight, one would expect that the value of non market
time B would show up in the equation, because at a rate δ the worker is ﬁred and receives
the asset value of unemployment ρV U, see equation (2). However, since V E (  x) = V U, we
can substitute V E (  x) for V U, thereby eliminating B from the equation. For 0 < ψ < 1,
unemployed job seekers give up part of the option value of search by accepting a job. An
unemployed job seeker accepts a job oﬀer if and only if she is compensated for this loss in
option value, implying that W (  x) > B. For ψ = 1, on- and oﬀ-the-job search are equally
eﬃcient, so an unemployed job seeker does not give up any option value by accepting a
job. Hence: W (  x) = B, and equation (3) simpliﬁes to the same expression as equation
(2):
ρV
E (  x) = uB + (1 − u)ExW.
Asset value of vacancies
Adding up the zero proﬁt condition for all vacancies implies that the total cost of main-
taining vacancies must be equal to the aggregate rents that ﬁrms make in currently ﬁlled
jobs. In Appendix A.1 we show that
vK = (1 − u)(ExY − ExW). (4)
The left hand side of this equation is the total cost of vacancies at t = 0. The right hand
side is employment 1 − u times the quasi-rents per worker, which is equal to expected
output ExY minus expected wages ExW. One would expect that quasi-rents should be
discounted, since ﬁrms must ﬁrst post a vacancy before they can make a proﬁt. However,
as for the asset value of employment, the right-hand side is again a weighted average of
cohorts of vacancies and discounting is oﬀset by the growth of the economy.
The reservation value of the mismatch indicators
The deﬁnition of   x as the mismatch indicator of a job which is just acceptable to an
11unemployed job seeker implies:





To understand this condition, note that if W (  x) < Y (  x), there would be a job type
|x| >   x for which an employer could oﬀer a wage W, W (  x) < W < Y (x), which would be
attractive to both the worker and the ﬁrm, which is inconsistent with proﬁt maximization,
while if W (  x) > Y (  x), the ﬁrm would be better oﬀ by not hiring the worker at all, which
is again inconsistent with proﬁt maximization. Substitution of equation (2) and (4) in
the condition V E (  x) = V U yields,
W (  x) = [u + ψ(1 − u)]B + (1 − ψ)(1 − u)ExW. (6)
When on and oﬀ the job search are equally eﬃcient, ψ = 1, equation (6) simpliﬁes to:





where the last step follows from (5). Hence, the relation between γ and   x does not
depend on expected wages in this case, and consequently neither on whether or not ﬁrms
can commit on paying hiring premiums.
The output loss due to search frictions
The deﬁnition of the output loss due to search frictions is given by:
X = (1 − u)(1 − ExY ) + u(1 − B) + vK = 1 − (1 − u)ExY − uB + vK. (8)
The output loss is equal to employment, 1−u, times the diﬀerence between productivity
in the optimal assignment, Y (0) = 1, and the expected productivity in the actual assign-
ment, ExY , plus unemployment, u, times the diﬀerence between the productivity in the
optimal assignment and the value of non market time, 1 − B, plus the cost of keeping
vacancies open, vK. Substitution of equation (2) and (4) in (8) yields:
X = 1 − ρV
U = u(1 − B) + (1 − u)(1 − ExW). (9)
The last step follows from the fact that by the zero proﬁt condition, the cost of main-
taining vacancies is equal to the surplus of expected productivity over expected wages,
see equation (4). The ﬁrst equality tells us that the output loss is equal to the output in
the optimal assignment (Y (0) = 1) minus the asset value of unemployment. As frictions
12become smaller workers ﬁnd jobs close to the optimal assignment quickly and X becomes
smaller. The second equality in (9) tells us that the output loss is equal to the sum of
the output loss for unemployed and for employed workers. The former is equal to the lost
output in the optimal assignment minus the value of non market time, while the latter is
equal to the foregone wage income. Under free entry, the diﬀerence between wages and
productivity is spent on vacancies.
2.4 Equilibrium ﬂow conditions
Under both assumptions for wage setting, commitment and no-commitment, wages are a
decreasing function of x for x ≥ 0, Wx (x) > 0, implying that workers accept any job-oﬀer
with a lower mismatch indicator |x| than their current job. Hence, we can analyze job-
to-job ﬂows independent of the exact form of the wage policy W (x). Let G(x),x ≥ 0, be
the fraction of workers employed in jobs at smaller distance from their optimal job than
|x|. This implies that G(0) = 0 and G(  x) = 1, since   x is the largest acceptable value of
|x|. The golden growth assumption requires that the number of workers employed in jobs
with a mismatch indicator lower than x grows at a rate ρ:
2λx{u + ψ(1 − u)[1 − G(x)]} − δ(1 − u)G(x) = ρ(1 − u)G(x). (10)
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side is the number of people that ﬁnd a job with mismatch
indicator lower than x, either from unemployment (the ﬁrst term in braces), or by mobility
from jobs with a larger mismatch indicator (the second term in brackets). The number
of better jobs is given by 2x, since the worker can accept jobs both to the left and to the
right of her favorite job type x = 0. The second term in brackets is weighted by the factor
ψ, reﬂecting the eﬃciency of on- relative to oﬀ-the-job search. The ﬁnal term on the left-
hand side is the outﬂow of workers due to job-destruction. The right-hand side reﬂects
that at the balanced growth path, employment grows at a rate ρ at all levels including
the class of workers with a mismatch indicator smaller than x, G(x). Mobility within this
class is irrelevant because the disappearance of the old match and the emergence of the
new one cancel. Evaluating (10) at   x yields:
δ(1 − u) + ρ − 2λ  xu = ρu.
13Solving for u yields:
u =
1






Substitution of (11) into condition (10) yields:
G(x) = 1 −
  x − x
(1 + ψκx)   x
, (12)
g (x) =
1 + ψκ  x
  x(1 + ψκx)
2,
where g (x) is the density function of x among employed workers.
2.5 Wage formation
The wage formation processes are the same as in Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren
(2010). We present their main results here. Since the model is symmetric around x = 0,
we can focus on the analysis of W (x) for x ≥ 0.
Wage setting with commitment
When ﬁrms can commit on future wage payments, the optimal wage policy of the ﬁrm




u + ψ (1 − u)   G(W)
  Y (x) − W
ρ + δ + ψλF(W)
 
, (13)
where   G[W (x)] ≡ 1 − G(x) is the distribution of wages among employed workers and
where F [W (x)] ≡ 1− x
¯ x is the wage oﬀer distribution, using the fact that the distribution
of x is uniform by assumption. The eﬀect of   G(W) on the optimal wage oﬀer is the hiring





[Y (x) − W (x)]. (14)
This diﬀerential equation can be solved analytically for W (x), using equation (5) as an
initial condition, see Appendix A.4.
Wages setting without commitment
14When ﬁrms cannot commit on future wage payments, hiring premiums are non-credible
and. Hence, the term   G(W) in equation (13) is replaced by 1 − G(x) reﬂecting that the
ﬁrst term in brackets does not depend on the wage and that the wage maximizes the value




[Y (x) − W (x)]. (15)
The only diﬀerence with equation (14) is a factor two, reﬂecting the fact that ﬁrms pay
hiring and no quit premia in the case of commitment, while they pay only a no quit
premium in the case without commitment. Again, this diﬀerential equation can be solved
analytically for W (x), using equation (5) as an initial condition.
3 Measuring wage dispersion, mismatch and the out-
put loss
This section shows that our model yields robust predictions on the relation between wage
dispersion, unemployment, the ratio of job-to-job and unemployment-employment ﬂows,
and the output loss due to search frictions and that this depends on only a few easily
observable statistics. We also oﬀer a methodology to test those predictions empirically.
The argument requires a number of steps. As a map for the reader, we ﬁrst provide an
overview of these steps.
1. We show that we can normalize κ = 1 without loss of generality, and that this
normalization implies that the equilibrium is fully characterized by just three para-
meters: the equilibrium rate of unemployment u, the value of non market time B,
and the relative eﬃciency of on versus oﬀ the job search ψ.
2. We derive a simple and robust measure of wage dispersion and provide an analytical
characterization of the equilibrium. The measure we propose is the max-mean wage
diﬀerential, W (0)−ExW. This measure is less sensitive for the extreme long right
tail of the mismatch indicator |x| for identical workers and to the precise value
of ψ than dispersion measures based on the lowest wage. Moreover, we derive a
relation between u, the ratio of employment-to-employment and unemployment-to-
employment hazard rates, and ψ. We use the empirical value of these hazards to
establish the range of admissible values of ψ.
153. In an empirical application, data on x will be only partially observed. This causes
special problems due to the non-diﬀerentiability of lnW (x) at x = 0. Deﬁne
x = r + q,
where r is the observed and q is the unobserved component of x, with Var[x] = σ2
x
and Cov[r,q] = 0. We show that values of r close to zero provide only limited
information on the eﬀect of x on W (x). We simulate data on x,q, and W (x) and
use these data to estimate the quadratic equation
lnW − ElnW = ω0 + ω2r
2 + ε,
where ω0 and ω2 are parameters and where ε is an error term. We show that ω0 is
informative on the max-mean wage diﬀerential and that it depends on the signal-
noise ratio.
4. We derive empirical proxies of s and c (s and c) and consequently of r ≡ s − c,
using a methodology outlined in Gautier and Teulings (2006). We provide some
additional robustness checks to this method and use these proxies to estimate ω0.
5. We show how our model relates to the hedonic/assignment models of Rosen (1974),
Sattinger (1975), Teulings (1995). These models have direct implications for the
elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers, as estimated by Katz
and Murphy (1992). In particular, there is a one-to-one correspondence between this
elasticity of substitution and the second derivative, γ, of the production function
Y (x). This relation enables us to establish the units of measurement of x and allows
us to estimate the output loss due to mismatch.
6. We calculate and decompose the expected output loss due to search frictions for the
set of acceptable values of ψ.
These steps will be discussed in the next 6 subsections. Essentially, for given {B,ψ,ω0,σ2
x,γ},
the model implies a value for u. Following the tradition in this literature, we set B = 0.4.
Since step 2 yields an estimate for ψ, step 4 for ω0 and σ2
x, and step 5 for γ, this theoretical
relation serves as a test for the model. The model performs surprisingly well.
163.1 Normalizing κ = 1
The ﬁrst step is to show that κ can be normalized to one without loss of generality. Deﬁne
a linear transformation of x,   x ≡ κx, and the parameters   x ≡ κ  x and   γ ≡ κ−2γ. Then
u =
1
1 + κ  x
=
1
1 +   x
(16)




2 = 1 −
1
2
  γ  x
2. (17)
It can be easily checked that this transformation leaves all other primitives of the model
unaﬀected. Hence, by redeﬁning x as   x and γ as   γ, we can normalize κ to one. The
implication of this normalization is that the equilibrium of this sorting model with search
frictions is a function of only three statistics, the rate of unemployment u, the value of
non market time B, and the relative eﬃciency of on- versus oﬀ-the-job search, ψ. It does
not depend on the curvature of the production function γ. The unemployment rate is
obviously not a primitive of the model, but an outcome. However, since we have an idea
about the value of the natural rate of unemployment, it is useful to have a characterization
of the equilibrium in terms of the value of u. The reason why the parameter γ does not
enter the characterization of the equilibrium can most easily be understood for the case
ψ = 1. (16) and (17) reveal that the normalization of κ to unity implies that the value
of the mismatch indicator in the worst acceptable job oﬀer   x is a simple function of the
unemployment rate. Then, equation (7) (and replacing x by   x) shows that   γ can be
written as a simple function of the unemployment rate and the value of non market time
only.
Figure 3 depicts the density and distribution function of the mismatch indicator |  x|
conditional on employment, for the case u = 4% and ψ = 1 (we use these values in
all subsequent plots, unless stated otherwise). For a given unemployment rate, G(  x) is
identical with or without commitment since workers climb the job ladder equally fast in
both cases (because wages are in both cases strictly decreasing in x). The main message
from Figure 3 is that the distribution of |  x| has a large probability mass close to zero (the
optimal assignment) and a long right tail of bad matches. The median value of   x is equal
to (1 − u)/(1 + u) < 1, far smaller than   x = (1 − u)/u = 24.0 (the mismatch indicator
in the worst match). The reason for this pattern is that workers who are matched badly
quit their jobs fast. The reverse holds for good matches, so their density is high. The
skewness of the distribution of |  x| has a number of counter intuitive implications for the
wage distribution that are spelled out in greater detail below.
17Figure 3: The distribution (thick black) and density function (thin red) of x conditional
on employment
The analytical expressions for W (  x),Wx(  x), and ExW are complicated and highly
non-linear, so we placed them in Appendix A.4. Figure 4 depicts Y (  x) and W (  x) both for
the case with and without commitment, setting the value of non market time at B = 0.4
(which we do in all subsequent plots). Some authors, i.e. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
and Hall (2009) who want to explain the cyclical behavior of unemployment use larger
values for B. For these studies, the value of non-market time of the marginal worker is
relevant whereas here we are interested in the value of non-market time for the average
worker so a lower value is justiﬁed. Contrary to Y (  x), W (  x) is non-diﬀerentiable at
  x = 0. This is due to the hiring and no-quit premiums that ﬁrms pay. Since the density
of employment is highest for low values of |  x|, the elasticity of labor supply is high for
these types of job. A slight variation in wages has large eﬀects both on the probability
that workers accept an outside job oﬀer and on the number of workers who are prepared
to accept the wage oﬀer (the latter being relevant in the case with commitment only).
Hence, ﬁrms will bid up wages aggressively for these types of jobs. Since ψ = 1, workers
accept any job oﬀer that pays more than the value of non market time.
Figure 4 shows that the wage in the optimal assignment is higher when ﬁrms can
commit than when they cannot, since the ability to commit increases competition between
ﬁrms for workers. Given the wage setting policy of other ﬁrms, the ability to commit allows
a ﬁrm to make more proﬁts, because the hiring premium enables it to ﬁll its vacancies
18Figure 4: Productivity Y (x) (thick) and wages W (x) with (thin) and without (dotted)
commitment
faster. However, since all other ﬁrms do the same, proﬁts are lower compared to the
case without commitment. Figure 4 also reveals that for   x = 0 the slope of the wage
function is smaller (in absolute value) for the case with than without commitment. This
is remarkable, since the only diﬀerence between the expressions for the slope is a factor
2 in the diﬀerential equations for wages for the case with commitment, compare equation
(14) and (15). From this point of view, one would expect a steeper wage function for the
case with commitment. However, the slope is proportional to the ﬂow proﬁts per worker,
i.e. the diﬀerence between the productivity and wages, Y (  x) − W (  x). This diﬀerence is
more than twice as large in the case without commitment, yielding a steeper wage function
in that case. A comparison with ﬁgure 3 reveals that despite the zero derivative of W (  x)
at   x =   x, the wage distribution has a fat right tail. Hence, in empirical applications,
the reservation wage (the lowest observed wage) is highly sensitive to the exact deﬁnition
of the lowest wage. The 1st percentile is very diﬀerent from the 2nd percentile while the
98thand 99th percentile are very similar. The mean-min wage diﬀerential as proposed by
Hornstein et.al. (2010) is therefore a less robust statistic for measuring wage dispersion
of identical worker types than the max-mean diﬀerential.
193.2 The role of ψ
The expressions for the wage function W (  x) and the expected wage ExW can be used
to calculate the max-mean and the mean-min wage diﬀerentials. These expressions are
depicted in Figure 5 for the case with commitment together with the output loss due
to search frictions. First, note that the max-mean diﬀerential is largely independent of
ψ, while the mean-min diﬀerential is very sensitive to the precise value of ψ. For the
case without commitment (not in the Figure) the max-mean diﬀerential varies even less
with ψ. It is important to realize that this is not a comparative statics exercise in ψ,
for then it would not make sense to keep u constant. The question addressed here is
what wage diﬀerential and output loss are consistent with a particular value of ψ and an
unemployment rate of 4%. Implicitly, the value of γ adjusts to keep the unemployment
rate at this level. The reason why ψ does not matter for the max-mean wage diﬀerential
is that lowering the value of ψ while keeping u constant has two oﬀsetting eﬀects on wage
diﬀerentials near the optimal assignment. The density of   x at the optimal assignment
is equal to g (0) = ψ + u/(1 − u), see equation (12). Hence, a lower value of ψ implies
that there are fewer workers close to the optimal assignment since search by employed
workers is less eﬃcient and since employed job seekers are a particularly relevant source
of labour supply for an   x = 0. This reduces the mean wage. Therefore, holding W (  x)
constant, a lower value of ψ yields a larger max-mean wage diﬀerential. However, holding
  x constant, unemployed job seekers become more choosy if ψ goes down since they give
up a share 1 − ψ of the option value of search by accepting a job. Therefore, the lowest
wage W (  x) increases by a lot and consequently the mean wage increases a bit as well; the
total eﬀect is that wage diﬀerentials become smaller. For the mean-max diﬀerential, the
negative and positive eﬀects on the mean wage almost cancel while the maximum wage
is unaﬀected. Hence, contrary to the max-mean diﬀerential, the mean-min diﬀerential is
particularly sensitive to the value of ψ.
Second, the max-mean diﬀerential on the one hand and the mean-min and max-min
wage diﬀerentials on the other hand tell opposite stories about the eﬀect of commitment
on wage diﬀerentials. Commitment makes ﬁrms compete more ﬁercely for workers, driving
up the maximum wage. Since the minimum wage is the same for the case with and without
commitment, this would imply that the max-mean diﬀerential is larger under commitment.
However, since the slope of the wage function close to the optimal assignment is smaller
under commitment, see Figure 4, the max-mean diﬀerential is actually smaller; 5.6% of
20Figure 5: Wage diﬀerentials and output loss (with commitment), max-mean diﬀerential
(thick), mean-min (thin), welfare loss (dashed)
the wage in the optimal assignment with commitment versus 8.8% without commitment.
The relation between the max-mean diﬀerential, the output loss and the unemployment
rate is plotted in Figures 6 and 7 for the commitment and the no-commitment case
respectively. The non-linearity is hardly visible in the case of commitment.
In the Appendix A.3 we derive a relation between the ratio of the employment-to-
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Unfortunately, the evidence on fee and fue for the US yields values of ψ that range from
above 1, see Nagypal (2008), to values close to 0, see Hornstein et.al. (2010). What
explains this wide range? The value of fee is 2.7% according to Fallick and Fleischman
(2004), 2.9% according to Nagypal and after a correction for missing records in the CPS,
Moscarini and Vella (2008) get a value of 3.3%.3 The main reason why Hornstein et
3Nagypal’s values come from the SIPP and the CPS. She argues that those estimates are downwardly
biased because when workers ﬁnd a new job when employed but there is a lag in starting this new
job, it is not uncommon to brieﬂy register to be unemployed. In the data this implies an employment-
unemployment transition followed by an unemployment-employment transition. She argues that this bias
is larger than the time aggregation bias in the unemployment outﬂow rate (some workers loose and ﬁnd
a job between the interview dates).
21Figure 6: The max-mean wage diﬀerential (solid) and the output loss (dashed) (with
commitment) for ψ = 1
Figure 7: The max-mean wage diﬀerential (solid) and the output loss (dashed) (without
commitment) for ψ = 1.
22al. (2011) arrive at a lower value for ψ is that they use Shimer’s (2005) estimate of the
employment-to-unemployment hazard rate feu, which equals 3%. Shimer’s estimate is
corrected for time aggregation while Nagypal’s estimate is not. The problem of using
this high value of feu is that according to the BLS statistics, median tenure is 53 months.
Without accounting for duration dependence and ignoring the ﬂow out of the labor forces,
this implies that the total hazard out of the current job, fee +feu, is 1.3%.4 At ﬁrst sight,
the diﬀerence between this estimate and Shimer’s can be readily explained by negative
duration dependence. Negative duration dependence implies that the hazard rate for low-
tenure workers is above 1.3% and the rate for high tenure workers is below 1.3%. The
average hazard rate is then higher than 1.3%. The theoretical model predicts negative
duration dependence, since bad matches with high quit rates die out and good matches
with low quite rates survive. However, in the model, the negative duration dependence
is fully accounted for by the fee hazard rate. So in the data, for high-tenure workers, feu
is much lower than the value reported by Shimer and for low-tenure workers it is even
higher. Clearly, the model does not capture all features of reality. Apparently, a small
group of weakly attached workers frequently ﬂow between un- and employment.5 In order
to capture this we need other mechanisms like learning, see Moscarini (2005), or random
growth, see Buhai and Teulings (2006). Since the aim of our model is to describe the
behavior of the median worker, we must accept that the model is ill suited to explain the
behavior of this speciﬁc group. Using continuous-time transition rates data from (1967-
2010) which are calculated in a similar manner to Shimer (2007), we obtain fue = 38%,
which implies fee/fue = 2.9
38 = 0.076.6 However, if we are interested in the median worker,
the maximum value that fue can obtain is 31%.7 Together with Nagypal’s fee rate this
implies, fee/fue = 2.9
31 = 0.092%. Figure 8 suggests that in order to mimic this ratio, ψ
should be between 0.5 and 1.
4Ignoring ﬂows out of the labor force, the total hazard outof employment can be solved from 1 −
exp[−53(fee + feu)] = 0.5.
5Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2008) show that this is a particular feature of the US labor market. Mobility
rates in the other OECD countries are substantially lower.
6We thank Bart Hobijn for sharing his data.
7In steady state, fue = feu
1−u
u where feu < 1.3%. For a frictional unemployment rate of 4% this
implies that fue < 0.31.
23Figure 8: Range of ψ for u = 6% (fat), u = 5% (dashed), and u = 4% (thin)
3.3 Inference on wages diﬀerentials
Our goal is to confront this model with data on wages, worker-skills s, and job-complexity
levels c, (which we use to calculate the mismatch indicator x ≡ s − c). Since we have
no idea about the units of measurement of the normalized mismatch indicator   x, we
ﬁrst create a non-normalized measure for x. Then, in the next section we discuss the
appropriate normalization procedure.
We must ﬁrst deal with the problem that data on s and c provide only partial infor-
mation on the mismatch indicator. Some variation is unobserved by the researcher. Due
to the non-diﬀerentiability of lnW (x) at x = 0, this unobserved heterogeneity has large
implications for the estimation of the wage equation. Let r and q be the observed and
the unobserved component in x respectively:
x = r + q,
where Cov[r,q] = 0. Let w ≡ lnW−E[lnW].
Since the function W (x) is symmetric and non-diﬀerentiable around x = 0, a simple
approach is to estimate,
w = ω0 − ω1 |x| + ε, (19)
ω0 > 0 and ω1 > 0 are parameters to be estimated and where ε ≡ lnW(x)−ω1 |x|, is an
error term with zero mean. We propose to estimate this model in logs rather than levels
for two reasons. The main reason is that we normalized output in the optimal assignment
24to unity, Y (0) = 1. Since W (0) ￿ Y (0) = 1, Wx(0) has the interpretation of the relative
decline in wages around the optimal assignment. This interpretation carries over to ω1
when we estimate the model in logs. Secondly, we apply the model in the context of an
hierarchical model, where the wage in the optimal assignment depends on the worker’s
skill level s. In that context, we cannot simultaneously normalize the wage in the optimal
assignment for all skill levels. Estimating the model in logs resolves this problem.
Suppose we estimate equation (19) by simply replacing x by its observed component
r. Equation (19) can be viewed of as a ﬁrst order Taylor expansion of the exact relation
between log wages and the mismatch indicator x around x = 0. The parameter ω1
could then be interpreted as an estimate of dlnW (x)/dx|x=0 = Wx (0)/W (0). However,
even if this Taylor expansion were a perfect approximation of lnW (x), ω1 will be a biased
estimator of Wx(0)/W (0) due to the convexity of the wage function at x = 0. We proceed
by approximating the distributions of the observed and unobserved components by normal
distributions and then check with numerical simulations how good the approximations are.
The subsequent lemma is helpful.
Lemma 1 Assume: r ∼ N (0,σ2













Then the following equalities hold:


































where υ in the ﬁnal line is interpreted as a residual term and where the coeﬃcients in the
second line are set to minimize the residual sum of squares:
   
υ
2ψ(r,q)dqdr =
     















and ψ (r,q) is the joint density function of r and q. By construction: E[υ] = 0.
The derivation of these relations is in the Appendix. The ﬁrst equation in lemma 1
gives a fourth order Taylor expansion for the conditional expectation of the absolute value
of the mismatch indicator x = r + q, conditional on its observed component r. The ﬁrst
25Figure 9: Smoothing of an absolute value function by random mixing for σ2
q = σ2
r = 1:
|x| (thin), E[|x||r] (thin), Taylor expansion (dashed thick), least squares estimate (thick)
and the third derivatives of E[|x||r] with respect to r are zero, so that the ﬁrst and the
third order term in the Taylor expansion drop out. The ﬁnal line gives a least squares
approximation of |x| regressed on an intercept and the observed component squared r2.
Figure 9 shows the true function E[|x||r], its Taylor expansion for σ2
q = 1, and its least
squares approximation for σ2
r = σ2
q = 1. The observed component r is not very informative
about the value |x| for r ∼ = 0: for |r| varying between 0 and 1, E[|x||r] varies between
0.80 and 1. Variation of r in the tails of the distribution is much more informative on the
actual value of the mismatch indicator; limr→∞ dE[|x||r]/dr = 1 and mutatis mutandis
the same for limr→−∞. The Taylor expansion is fairly precise for |r| < 1. The precision
of the least square approximation is excellent for a much wider range of |r| < 2.5.
The results in Lemma 1 and Figure 9 justify the idea of approximating the underlying
model (19) by a regression model of w with a quadratic term in r:
w = ω0 − ω2r
2 + ε. (20)
Under the assumption of joint normality of r and q, the relation between the structural






















26The ﬁrst line establishes a relation between the parameters ω0 and ω2 of the regression
model (20) and the parameter ω1 of the underlying model (19). The ﬁrst equality follows
from taking expectations in equation (20), using E[w] = 0 and E[r2] = σ2
r. The second
equality is an application of the least square result of Lemma 1 that a least square re-












on the true variance of the mismatch indicator, the coeﬃcient ω0 is proportional to the
variance of x that is observed, σ2
r/σ2
x. The second line assesses the expected loss in log
wages due to the term ω1 |x| in the ’true’ model in equation (19). The ﬁrst equality uses
the second line in Lemma 1. The second equality uses the ﬁrst line of (21). The para-
meter ω0 underestimates the expected loss by a factor 2σ2
x/σ2
r. If the mismatch indicator
would be perfectly observed, (σ2
r = σ2
x), ω0 would still underestimate the expected loss
by a factor 2. The reason for this underestimation is that the quadratic approximation of
E[|r + q||r] is not perfect, in particularly not when the variance of q is small, since then
r converges to x and since the parabola x2 is a bad approximation of the absolute value
function |x|.
The following relations hold:
W (0) − ExW ￿ lnW (0) − lnExW ￿ w(0) − E[w] = max[w] ￿ 2ω0. (22)
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that 1 > W (0) >ExW. The second inequality
is due to Jensen’s inequality, lnExW >ExlnW. The intuition why both inequalities hold
approximately with equality is simple. The smaller the wage diﬀerentials are (either
because u is small or B is close to Y (0)), the closer W (x) is to one for all x, so that
the approximation lnW ￿ W −1 applies. Substituting this approximation in yields both
approximate equalities. The third equality follows from the fact that w(0) = max[w] and
E[w] = 0. The ﬁnal approximation follows from equation (21); the equality holds when
the mismatch indicator is fully observed, σ2
x = σ2
r. We propose to use 2ω0 as an estimate of
the max-mean wage diﬀerential, W (0)−ExW. Note that the estimate of ω0 is insensitive
to a proportional transformation of r. Suppose that we would use   r2 = ζr,ζ > 0 instead
of r2 as a regressor. That would aﬀect the coeﬃcient ω2, but not the intercept ω0. Hence,
the proposed measure of wage loss due to search frictions ω0 is insensitive to the unit of
measurement of the observed component r of the mismatch indicator. It is only sensitive
to the share of the variance of the mismatch indicator that is actually observed by the
researcher.
27The above conclusions apply when lnW (0)−lnExW is well approximated by ω0−ω1 |x|
and when the normal distribution is a good approximation of the true distribution of r
and q. However, both conditions do typically not hold. Figure 9 shows that ω0 −ω1 |x| is
an imperfect approximation of lnW (x) and Figure 3 shows that the distribution of x is
far from normal, and hence, the distributions of its components r and q cannot be jointly
normal. We therefore use numerical simulations to evaluate the impact of those violations.
We use the benchmark values for the eﬃciency of on- versus oﬀ-the-job search that we
used before: ψ = 1. We present two results for three values of the unemployment rate u
and for four values of the value of non market time B. Table 1 contains some statistics
based on the analytical relations derived for the theoretical model, both for the case
with and without commitment in wage setting. The ﬁrst column, 1
2γσ2
x, is the expected






x. As shown by
equation (16), this statistic is insensitive to the units of measurement of x. Moreover, it is
the same for the case with and without commitment (keeping constant the unemployment
rate), because the pattern of job mobility and the value of γ depend only on the rate of
unemployment. Since all wage diﬀerentials are proportional to 1−B, so is the max-mean
diﬀerential. The variance of log wages becomes very large for B = 0, much larger than is
observed empirically even for countries with extreme income inequality and even without
controlling for the share of wage dispersion that is accounted for by observable diﬀerences
in human capital. Hence, just a ﬁrst look at the data rejects the version of the model
where B → 0 and ψ → 1. The reason for this is that for ψ = 1 and B = 0, the lowest
wage W (x) is equal to zero, and hence the mean-min ratio is −∞. Therefore„ a small
probability mass at the bottom of the wage distribution has a disproportional eﬀect on
the variance. Stated diﬀerently: though wage diﬀerentials are proportional to 1−B, and
hence, the variance of the wage is proportional to (1 − B)
2, this proportionality does not
carry over to log wage diﬀerentials and their variance. Finally, max[w] is a reasonable
estimate for the max-mean wage diﬀerential, in particular for the commitment case, but
not for B ≤ 0.2 and u = 7.5%. The ﬁnal column presents the wage dispersion statistic
proposed by Hornstein et.al. (2010), the mean-min wage ratio. Besides that this statistic
depends a lot on ψ, it also depends strongly on the value of non market time, B.
Tables 2 and 3 provide information on the ﬁnal approximation in equation (22). For
this analysis, we draw 10,000 values of r and q.8 We do this for diﬀerent values of B
8Technically we do this by drawing 10,000 values of x from g(x) and by adding to it some measure-







to it. We treat x + e as (a monotonic transformation of) the observed
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2γσ2
x Var[w] W (0)−ExW max[w] ExW
W(x) X
commitment both yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no
u(%) B
2.5 0.0 0.022 0.173 0.238 0.062 0.113 0.103 0.182 ∞ ∞ 0.089 0.182
0.2 0.018 0.034 0.057 0.050 0.090 0.063 0.122 4.740 4.357 0.071 0.144
0.4 0.013 0.016 0.021 0.037 0.068 0.046 0.081 2.399 2.261 0.054 0.108
0.8 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.013 0.023 0.013 0.024 1.234 1.210 0.018 0.036
5.0 0.0 0.041 0.387 0.514 0.111 0.165 0.200 0.326 ∞ ∞ 0.166 0.291
0.2 0.033 0.066 0.082 0.089 0.132 0.119 0.184 4.510 3.991 0.133 0.232
0.4 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.067 0.099 0.079 0.123 2.318 2.121 0.100 0.174
0.8 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.022 0.033 0.024 0.035 1.219 1.186 0.033 0.058
7.5 0.0 0.057 0.608 0.626 0.150 0.197 0.295 0.403 ∞ ∞ 0.234 0.376
0.2 0.046 0.089 0.104 0.120 0.158 0.168 0.233 4.299 3.381 0.188 0.301
0.4 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.090 0.118 0.110 0.151 2.242 2.016 0.141 0.226
0.8 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.030 0.039 0.032 0.042 1.207 1.169 0.047 0.075
Table 1: Numerical values for wage diﬀerentials and the variance of log wages
and the signal-noise ratio σ2
r/σ2
q and estimate (21) for both the case with and without
commitment. The coeﬃcient ω0 attains a maximum when the signal to noise ratio is
greater than 0.5 (for u = 2.5% the maximum is at a ratio of 0.5 and when u = 7.5%, the
maximum is at a ratio of 2 for commitment and 1 for no commitment). For high values of
the signal to noise ratio, the data follow the kink in the wage function tightly, so that the
second order Taylor expansion provides a bad approximation of the true function. For
low values of the signal to noise ratio, most of the search frictions are not picked up by
its observed component. Both eﬀects have a negative impact on the value of ω0. Table
2 shows that indeed for σ2
r/σ2
q = 1/8, the parameter ω0 underestimates the max-mean
wage diﬀerential except for B = 0. We took σ2
r/σ2
q = 1/8 because this value is consistent
with our estimated ω0. From Table 3 we see that the log approximations are pretty bad
except if the signal-noise ratio is low. In the latter case, downward bias due to the low
signal to noise ratio oﬀsets the upward bias due to taking logs. For σ2
r/σ2
q and the more
realistic values, B ≥ 0.4, the estimated value of ω0 is underestimated by a factor 2 with
and a factor 3 without commitment. In general, our approximation works better for the
component r. Since the estimate of ω0 does not depend on the unit of measurement of r, we do not have
to scale x + e back.
29case with than without commitment. Our methodology does not allow us to distinguish
between the case with and without commitment, since the estimated value of ω0 is hardly
sensitive to this diﬀerence (except if B = 0 and frictions are large, u = 7.5%).
commitment yes no
u(%) B W (0)−ExW ω0 W (0)−ExW ω0
2.5 0.0 0.0624 0.0797 0.1128 0.0976
0.4 0.0374 0.0229 0.0677 0.0239
0.8 0.0125 0.0059 0.0226 0.0064
5.0 0.0 0.1108 0.0853 0.1645 0.1129
0.4 0.0665 0.0245 0.0987 0.0252
0.8 0.0222 0.0066 0.0329 0.0053
7.5 0 0.1503 0.0862 0.1972 0.1242
0.4 0.0902 0.0271 0.1183 0.0237
0.8 0.0301 0.0059 0.0394 0.0057
Table 2: Simulated estimates of ω0 for ψ = 1 and a signal-noise-ratio of 1/8
u(%) 2.5 5.0 7.5
Commitment? yes no yes no yes no
W (0)−ExW 0.0374 0.0677 0.0665 0.0987 0.0902 0.1183
σ2
r/σ2
q = 1/16 0.0127 0.0120 0.0140 0.0132 0.0101 0.0126
σ2
r/σ2
q = 1/8 0.0229 0.0239 0.0245 0.0252 0.0271 0.0237
σ2
r/σ2
q = 1/4 0.0328 0.0387 0.0406 0.0381 0.0431 0.0393
σ2
r/σ2
q = 1/2 0.0460 0.0470 0.0551 0.0585 0.0582 0.0555
σ2
r/σ2
q = 1 0.0454 0.0420 0.0610 0.0610 0.0716 0.1284
σ2
r/σ2
q = 2 0.0382 0.0405 0.0592 0.0631 0.0784 0.0758
Table 3: Simulated estimates of ω0 for B=0.4 and ψ = 1
3.4 Empirical proxies for s and c
The next step in the argument is to construct a proxy for the mismatch indicator r. Our
approach is to come up with empirical estimates of workers’ skill level s and the level of job
complexity c, denoted by s and c respectively, and to calculate the proxy as the diﬀerence
30between the two, r ≡ s−c. For that purpose, we use a methodology spelled out in Gautier
and Teulings (2006) and apply that to data for the United States taken from the March
supplements of the CPS 1989-1992, see Gautier and Teulings (2006), for details. First,
we must leave the hypothetical circular framework and enter the hierarchical one. Let
Y (s,c) denote the productivity of an s-type worker in a c-type job. Let this productivity
satisfy the following relation:
lnY (s,c) = s −
1
2
γ (s − c)
2 . (23)
Now, a worker of skill type s has both a comparative advantage in a job-type of the same
complexity c as her skill level s and an absolute advantage over other workers with a lower
skill, so that he receives a higher wage than these workers when employed in his optimal
assignment. The ﬁrst term captures the absolute advantage of better skilled workers
(the hierarchical aspect of the model). The second term captures the match quality.
Its speciﬁcation is equivalent to the circular model in equation ( 1 ), in the sense that:
Y ′′(0)/Y (0) = Ycc (c,c)/Y (c,c) = γ; this parameter is comparable to γ in equation
(1). The log supermodularity of Y (s,c) is suﬃcient for positive assortative matching in a
Walrasian equilibrium, see Teulings (1995). The optimal assignment c(s)of worker type
s maximizes her output. The ﬁrst order condition for this problem, Yc (s,c) = 0, implies
c(s) = s or x = 0. At ﬁrst sight the linearity of equation (23) in s seems to be a serious
limitation to its generality. However, Gautier and Teulings (2006) show that it is not.
Since we have not yet deﬁned the units of measurement of s yet, the linearity of the ﬁrst
term is just a matter of proper scaling of the skill index. Hence, the restrictive nature
of equation (23) is not in the ﬁrst but in the second term, namely that the coeﬃcient of
the second term, γ, does not vary with s.9 By a similar argument, the fact that equation
(23) is constructed such that the equilibrium assignment is characterized by the simple
identity c(s) = s instead of a more general function, is not a restriction to the model, but
just a matter of proper scaling of the complexity index c.
The equivalent of the log wage equation (19) that goes with this production function
reads:
lnW (s,c) = lnW (0,0) + s − ω   |s − c|. (24)
Since c(s) = s in the Walrasian equilibrium, c follows the same distribution as s. The
mismatch term in equation (24) vanishes for the optimal assignment c(s) = s, so that the
9Teulings (2005) refers to this case as the constant complexity dispersion equilibrium.
31worker’s log wage is equal to his skill level: lnW (s,c) = lnW (0,0)+s. Therefore, we can
construct an index of the worker’s skill level by running a regression of log wages on indi-
vidual characteristics. The coeﬃcients of these characteristics measure their contribution
to the skill index s. Does the same conclusion apply to the complexity index? At ﬁrst
sight, this is not the case, because the partial derivative of log wages with respect to c is
zero in the Walrasian equilibrium, since c(s) = s. Hence, s and c are perfectly correlated
in that case. However, a similar regression with job instead of worker characteristics does
yield an estimate of the contribution of these characteristics to the complexity index c.
We construct indices of s and c along these lines by the following procedure:
Normalization: The expectations of w conditional on s and conditional on c among
employed workers satisfy:
E[w|s] = s, (25)
E[w|c] = c.
This normalization is just a convenient way of scaling s and c. It has no empirical content,
but it is consistent with equation (23) for the Walrasian equilibrium: (i) c(s) = s and (ii)
because there are no search frictions in the Walrasian equilibrium, the zero proﬁt condition
implies Y (s,s) = W (s,s); hence: w = s. Since s and c are perfectly correlated in the
Walrasian equilibrium, it is futile to use the expectation operator in these expressions
for this equilibrium, since the distribution of s conditional on c is degenerate, and vice
versa. However, in the presence of search frictions, this correlation is no longer perfect
and we therefore have to take expectations over the mismatch indicator x = s − c. The
normalization above implies that we can construct a measure of s and c by running the
following regression:
w =   x
′  β + εs + εw, (26)
w =   z
′  α + εc + εw,
where   x and   z are vectors of observed worker and job characteristics respectively,10 where
εw captures measurement error in log wages, and where εs and εc capture (i) unobserved
10We apply the following personal characteristics: gender, total years of schooling, a third-order poly-
nomial in experience, highest completed education, being married, having a full- or part-time contract
as well as various cross terms of experience, education, and being married. As job characteristics, 520
occupation and 242 industry dummies are applied.
32characteristics of workers and jobs respectively and (ii) the eﬀect non-optimal assignment
on wages. It is convenient to normalize our data on   x and   z such that they have zero
mean. Since we deﬁned w to have a zero mean too, it does not make sense to include a
constant in this regression. The estimated parameter vector can then be used to construct
indices for the observed worker and job characteristics,
s =   x
′  β,
c =   z
′  α.
Again, both indices have zero mean by construction.11 So the skill measure is the predicted
wage conditional on worker characteristics and the job complexity level is the predicted
wage conditional on job characteristics. Next, we use these indices and estimate
w = ω0 + ωss + ωcc − ωsss
2 + 2ωscsc − ωccc
2 + ε, (27)
w = ω0 + ωss + ωcc − ω2 (s − c)
2 + ε.
The second regression imposes two restrictions ωss = ωcc = ωsc. At ﬁrst sight, this
equation seems inadequate to capture model (24). The model includes ﬁrst order terms
for both worker and job characteristics, s and c, where model (24) has only a ﬁrst order
term for the worker’s skill s. However, since worker and job characteristics are correlated
and since worker characteristics are only partially observed, observed job characteristics
will serve as a proxy for unobserved worker characteristics, so that we can expect both
ωs and ωc to be positive. The problem of establishing the "structural" value of ωs and
ωc has occupied labor economists ever since the publication of Krueger and Summers’
(1998) seminal paper on eﬃciency wages, see e.g. Bound and Katz (1988) or Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1998). The issue is whether ωc truly measures the eﬀect of job
characteristics, or whether it is merely a proxy for unobserved worker characteristics,
see Gautier and Teulings (2006) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) for a more elaborate
discussion. For now, we adhere to equation (24), which does not allow for a ’true’ ﬁrst
order eﬀect of job characteristics. The reason that (27) does not have a term |x| = |s − c|
but second order terms for worker and job characteristics, s2,sc, and c2 stems from the
fact that the unobserved component of x smooths the non-diﬀerentiability of |x| at x = 0,
11We also normalize s and c such that in a regression: w = β1s + β2s 2 + εw, β2 = 0 and the same for
c, see Gautier and Teulings (2006) for details.

























where as deﬁned before, r = s − c and σ2
r = 0.0306. The sign restrictions hold for all
three second order terms. The F-test12 rejects the restrictions ωss = ωcc = ωsc due to the
large number of observations that we use but the diﬀerence in R2 between the restricted
and the non-restricted model is only 0.0003.13 From this estimate of ω0 it also becomes
immediately clear from Table 2 that we need B > 0 in order to rationalize the observed
wage dispersion.
What legitimizes us to interpret the ﬁrst order term ωc as capturing unobserved het-
erogeneity in workers’ skills and why can we not interpret the second order terms in the
same manner? Why would second order terms really capture the concavity of the wage
function in the mismatch indicator x and not unobserved components in either s or c?
Gautier and Teulings (2006) argue that while the argument of unobserved heterogeneity
applies for ωc, it is much less likely to apply to the second order terms. They provide
three arguments. First, when observed and unobserved worker and job characteristics are
distributed jointly normal, it is impossible for second order terms to be a proxy for the
unobserved component of a ﬁrst order term, because the correlation of a second order
term in s and/or c with the unobserved skill index is a third moment, and third moments
of a normal distribution are equal to zero. A simple empirical test for this assertion is that
including the second order terms should not aﬀect the ﬁrst order terms, which turns out
to be the case. Second, the interpretation of these coeﬃcients as capturing the concavity
of the wage function implies sign restrictions, ωsc > 0,ωss < 0, and ωcc < 0, which are met
for all three coeﬃcients for all six countries for which the model is estimated in Gautier
and Teulings (2006). There is no reason why these restriction should hold when the sec-
ond order terms are to be rationalized from unobserved worker heterogeneity. Moreover
ωsc = −2ωss = −2ωcc, which holds approximately. Here, we add a third argument.14 If








13Actually, the size restrictions are not exactly correct. The exact restrictions account for diﬀerences
in the degree of observability in s and c, see Gautier and Teulings (2006) for details.
14We thank Jean Marc Robin for the idea of this test.
34function in the mismatch indicator, then their sign would depend on the vectors   x and
  z which capture worker and job characteristics respectively. If we would compose both
vectors out of mixtures of job and worker characteristics, e.g. experience and occupation
dummies in   x and education and industry dummies in   z, then the concavity result should
not come out. Table 4 reports the results for this test. For both alternative combinations,
putting education and occupation in s or putting education and industry in s (and the
remaining variables in c), the concavity result becomes either much weaker or even breaks
down. Hence, the concavity result only survives when worker and job characteristics are
separated in two variables and it is not a statistical artifact.
s includes: s c s2 c sc
educ, occ 0.517 0.650 −0.009 −0.037 0.094
(t) (132.6) (175.24) (−0.86) (−4.10) 6.17)
educ, ind 0.324 0.805 −0.050 0.010 0.053
(t) (79.9) (233.2) (−4.44) (1.10) (3.46)
Table 4: Test of concave relation between wages and s and c
3.5 The variance of the observed part of x
The regression (27) implies ω0 = 0.0241. The results presented in table 3 imply that
conditional on the assumption that the value of non market time is 0.4, the signal-to-noise
ratio is about 1/8. Since we use our estimate of ω0 to identify the signal-to-noise ratio, we
want to derive an empirical measure for mismatch which we can compare with the model’s
prediction. Let ρ2
s be the ratio of the variance of s to the variance of s + εs, and mutatis
mutandis the same for ρ2
c, and let σ2 be the variance of s + εs, which is by construction
equal to the variance of c + εc. For the CPS data, we ﬁnd ρ2
s = 0.395,ρ2
c = 0.427, and
σ2 = 0.402.15 As discussed before, the perfect correlation between s and c breaks down in
the presence of search frictions. Let ρ be the correlation between s and c. Before we can
15We use Bound and Krueger’s (1991) ﬁnding that the signal noise ratio for wages is about 0.85. The
R2 for the regressions (26) are 0.336 and 0.363 respectively and Var[w] is 0.342. Dividing those numbers
by 0.85 yields the results for ρ2
s and ρ2
c anf σ2.
35calculate Var[s − c], we must ﬁrst make the following assumption on their covariance.16
Assumption: Cov[s,c] = ρρ2
sρ2
c.
This assumption implies that the covariance between the observed part of worker char-
acteristics s and c (which is ρρ2
s) is distributed proportionally between the observed job
characteristics c and the unobserved component, εs. Since the former accounts for a
fraction ρ2



































In the limit close to the Walrasianequilibrium, ρ → 1, σ2






0. The reason is that even if s and c are perfectly correlated, as is the case in the Wal-
rasian equilibrium, their observed parts, s and c, are not perfectly correlated because both
are contaminated by measurement error. This problem seriously complicates inference on
mismatch. Do we observe a worker not assigned to her optimal job type because (i) we
mismeasure her skills, (ii) we mismeasure the complexity of the job, or because (iii) true












c − 2(1 − ρ)
. (29)
Substituting in a signal-to-noise ratio of 1/8 and the values of ρ2
s and ρ2




x = 2 × 0.027 × 0.342 = 0.019.
16This assumption is equivalent to the following assumption on the covariance matrix:
Var
 





















17The denominator derives the variation of the noise as the diﬀerence between the true signal x and its
observed value r. Strictly speaking, application of the model signal-measurement error requires that s−c
is independent of εs − εc, which is not the case due to regression to the mean: the mismatch indicator
x ≡ s − c cannot be simultaneously independent of s and c, as it is in the ciruclar model. This problem
is closely related to the corner problem discussed in Teulings and Gautier (2004). As long as σ2
x ≪ σ2,




0.395+0.427−2(ρ×0.395×0.427+1−ρ). Since ρ is close to unity, indeed: σ2
x ≪ σ2, see the previous
footnote.
36An expression for 1
2γσ2
x follows directly from the model, see Table 1. The information
that is missing is a value for γ that goes with the dimension of x used above. This is the
ﬁnal step in our procedure.
3.6 Hedonics and the curvature of the production function γ
For the derivation of a value for γ, we use the fact that the interpretation of the circular
model as a simpliﬁed representation of an hierarchical assignment model allows us to
draw an analogy to the theory of imperfect substitution between low and high skilled
workers, see Teulings (2005) and Teulings and Van Rens (2008). In fact, γ measures the
curvature of Rosen’s "kissing" oﬀer and utility curves, see Figure 2. We can establish
a relation between our estimation results and the elasticity of substitution between low
and high skilled workers as estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992). In the speciﬁcation
of the model considered so far, the distribution of worker-skills and job-complexities was
kept constant, and we normalized the deﬁnition of the skill index s and complexity index
c such that the optimal assignment was given by c(s) = s. In this section, the optimal
assignment depends on the supply and demand for skill types. We follow the derivation
in Teulings and Van Rens (2008). First, we characterize the Walrasian equilibrium of this
assignment problem. In that equilibrium, every s-type worker is employed in her optimal
assignment c(s). Next, we do comparative statics to analyze the eﬀect on relative wages
of a shift in the mean of the skill distribution. Note that given that the production
technology is a second order approximation around the Walrasian assignment of a more
general technology, we can calculate γ around the optimal assignment.
Due to the assumption of comparative advantage of skilled workers in complex jobs,
the optimal assignment is an increasing function, c′(s) > 0. Let Y ∗ be aggregate output
per worker. We assume that this output is produced by a Leontieﬀ technology, requiring
the input of all c-type jobs in ﬁxed proportions. Let h(c) be the density of the input
of a c-type job required to produce one unit of aggregate output. Equilibrium on the
commodity market for job type c(s) requires the equality of supply and demand for each
s-type:
Y
∗h[c(s)] = g (s)Y [s,c(s)]/c
′ (s), (30)
where g (s) is the skill density function. The left hand side is the demand for the output of
job type c(s); it is equal to aggregate output Y ∗ times the density of job type c(s) required
per unit of aggregate output, h[c(s)]. The right hand side is the supply of output of job
37type c(s); it is equal to the density of worker type s, times its productivity in job type
c(s), Y [s,c(s)] times the Jacobian ds/dc = 1/c′ (s). We assume s and c to be distributed
normally with mean  s and  c respectively and identical standard deviations σs = σc =
σ. Teulings and Gautier (2004) show that locally (around the optimal assignment) the
distribution of s and c can be approximated by a uniform. Without loss of generality, we
normalize  c = σ2; the only thing that matters in this model turns out to be the diﬀerence
between  s and  c. Taking logs in equation (30) and using the density function for h( )



















γ [s − c(s)]
2 − lnc
′ (s). (31)
This equation should hold identically for all s.
Let lnW (s) be the log wage for worker type s in equilibrium. The zero proﬁt condition
implies W (s) = Y [s,c(s)]. Firms oﬀering jobs of type c choose their preferred worker type
s as to maximize proﬁts, or equivalently, to minimize the log of the cost of production per
unit of output, lnW (s)−lnY (s,c). Hence, the equilibrium wage function W (s) satisﬁes






|c=c(s) = 1 − γ [s − c(s)], (32)
where we use equation (23) in the second equality. The system of equations (31) and (32)
is solved by the following expressions for c(s) and W (s):
c(s) = s −  s,
dlnW (s)
ds
= 1 − γ s.
The wage function lnW (s) is linear in s. dlnW (s)/ds = 1 − γ s is the return to the
human capital index s. This return depends on the supply of human capital, that is, on
the mean of the skill distribution. The equilibrium assignment of section 3.4, c(s) = s,
implies that  s = 0. In that case dlnW (s)/ds = 1, as is implied by equation (23). A
percentage point upward shift in the mean of the skill distribution,  s, reduces the return
to human capital by γ % point. Hence, γ is related to the inverse of the elasticity of
substitution between high and low skilled workers as estimated by Katz and Murphy’s
(1992). That relationship can be analyzed more formally. Katz and Murphy split labour
into two skill groups, low and high, and consider the eﬀect on relative wages of a shift
38in labour supply from the one to the other. Let s∗ be the cut oﬀ level. All worker
types with s > s∗ are classiﬁed as high skilled; all other workers as low skilled. Hence,
Φ[σ−1 (s∗ −  s)] is the share of low skilled workers and Φ[−σ−1 (s∗ −  s)] is the share of
high skilled workers, where Φ( ) denotes the standard normal distribution function. Katz
and Murphy estimate the elasticity η, which is the ratio of the change in relative supply
of high and low skilled workers to the change in relative wages.
η ≡ −
d(lnΦ[σ−1 (s∗ −  s)] − lnΦ[−σ−1 (s∗ −  s)])/d s














where we use σ2 =Var[w] ∼ = 0.36. Teulings and Van Rens (2008) estimate directly the
relation between mean years of education and the return to human capital using panel
data for some 100 countries during the postwar period. They ﬁnd a similar value for the






3.7 Unemployment and composition of the output loss
Table 5 presents the value of u implied the empirical value of the model’s parameters,
B = 0,ψ = [1
2,1],ω0 = 0.024,σ2
x = 0.019,γ = 2. All values of ψ between 1
2 and 1 yield
reasonable predictions for u. The model performs therefore well. A low ψ makes workers
more choosy by increasing their reservation wage and therefore unemployment will be
higher. It also implies that workers move slower to their optimal job type making the
cross-sectional mass of workers around the optimal job type smaller.
ψ u(%)
fee
fue(%) W (0)−ExW ExW
W(x)
commitment both both yes no yes no
1/2 5.8 9.13 0.076 0.089 1.49 2.10
3/4 4.7 9.71 0.064 0.089 1.82 2.15
1 3.8 9.48 0.053 0.086 2.36 2.18
Table 5: Key statistics for diﬀerent values of ψ for B=0.4
39Table 6 shows that if ﬁrms can commit to wages, the output loss is between 7.8% and
12.2%, while if ﬁrms cannot, it is between 14.5% and 18.5%. The diﬀerence in output
loss between both wage-determination processes is due to a business stealing externality.
For ψ = 1, wage setting with commitment yields constrained eﬃciency, see Gautier et.al.
(2010). The idea is that without commitment, when opening a vacancy, individual ﬁrms
do not internalize the future output loss of the ﬁrm they will poach a worker from.
Although the transitions of workers to better matches are always eﬃcient, the expected
productivity gains are too small to justify the entry cost of the marginal ﬁrm from a social
point of view. For ψ = 1, the magnitude of this business-stealing externality is equal to
the diﬀerence in X with and without commitment.1920 Table 5 shows this diﬀerence to
be about 6%. Table 6 also shows that the lower is ψ, the larger is the fraction of X that
is due to mismatch. Again, there are two eﬀects of decreasing ψ, (i) the reservation wage
goes up and (ii) workers move slower to their optimal job type. The ﬁrst eﬀect reduces
the expected mismatch, while the second increases it. It turns out that the second eﬀect
dominates. The cost of unemployment makes up for only a small part of the total output
loss, in particular if ﬁrms cannot ex ante commit to their posted wages.
ψ 1/2 3/4 1
Commitment yes no yes no yes no
u(1 − B) 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.3
vK 1.4 7.7 3.7 10.3 2.6 9.3
(1 − u)1
2γσ2
x 7.3 7.3 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.9
X 12.2 18.5 9.7 16.3 7.8 14.5
Table 6: Decomposition of output loss due to frictions for B=0.4
3.8 Negative or positive assortative matching?
A recent paper by Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) argues that wage data allow us to identify
the strength of sorting but not whether there is positive or negative assortative matching
(PAM or NAM). Does the methodology outlined in this paper allow us to discriminate
empirically between NAMand PAM?As a ﬁrst observation, equation (23) imposes positive
19For other values of ψ, this is not the case, because then the value of γ diﬀers between the case with
and without commitment.
20Elliot (2006) discusses other wage mechanisms in a network framework that also internalize the
business-stealing externality.
40assortative matching by the second derivative of s being negative and the cross partial of
s and c being positive. An optimizing worker chooses the job type that satisﬁes Yc (s,c) =
0. The sign restrictions on the second derivatives impose positive assortative matching.
However, by just replacing c by −c, one obtains negative assortative matching. Since the
metric of c is undeﬁned, this statement does not have any empirical content. The reason is
that by allowing the worker to choose the job type that maximizes her output, the partial
derivative with respect to c is zero in the equilibrium assignment. Then, the distinction
between high and low productive jobs is meaningless, since for a marginal change in c,
net output will be the same, while for larger variations, output will be lower, irrespective
of whether it is a more or a less complex job than the observed optimal assignment. The
crucial issue is that free entry of ﬁrms of any c type implies that if suﬃciently many
workers prefer to be employed in a particular c type job, those vacancies will be opened.
This conclusion can also be inverted: if a model allows for free entry for types on either
the worker or the ﬁrm side of the market, the issue of positive versus negative assortative
matching looses its economic relevance. In absolute-advantage models like Shimer and
Smith (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), the reason that there exists an interior
optimal job type is that there are two opposite forces at work. More complex job types
generate more output but they also have a better outside option and therefore require a
larger share of the output. The only way to support free entry in that framework is to
have higher entry cost for more complex jobs. In that case, we still cannot rank jobs in
terms of their net proﬁtability (output minus entry cost).
4 Conclusion
This paper showed that within a general search model with on-the-job search and sorting
there exists a simple relation between three statistics: the unemployment rate, the value
of non market time, and the max-mean wage diﬀerential. This relationship does not
depend on any parameter, except for the eﬃciency of on- relative to oﬀ-the-job search.
However, we show that if wages are observed without measurement error this dependency
is a higher order phenomenon and that the precise value of the relative eﬃciency of on-the-
job search hardly matters for the relation between unemployment and wage dispersion.
In addition, we derive the ratio of employment-to-employment and unemployment-to-
employment hazard rates that is implied by the model. The model successfully explains an
unemployment rate of around 4%, the amount of wage-dispersion we observe in the data,
41and the observed labor-market ﬂows, and it is consistent with the degree of substitutability
between high and low-skilled workers. We therefore feel conﬁdent to use it to estimate
the output loss due to search frictions.
Search frictions directly generate output losses due to the fact that resources are al-
located sub-optimally and indirectly because decentralized wage mechanisms potentially
come with distortions. Allowing for two-sided heterogeneity is extremely important be-
cause it is the interaction between the search frictions, the type distributions and the
production technology that determines how important these frictions are. If workers are
identical and ﬁrms are identical then all contacts result in a match. Under two-sided
heterogeneity, the production technology matters because it speciﬁes how much output
is lost when a given job type is occupied by a sub-optimal worker type. Search frictions
generate a lot of output loss if a precize match is very important while if worker types are
almost perfect substitutes, the output loss will be will be modest. By combining informa-
tion on wage dispersion and the substitutability of worker types we can learn about the
actual amount of frictions and the importance of a precize match. We then use our model
to quantify and decompose this total output loss. As a test for the performance of the
model, we calculate the level of unemployment that is consistent with the frictions that
are implied by the observed wage dispersion. Depending on the relative eﬃciency of on-
the-job search, we ﬁnd that the rate of unemployment that our model implies is between
3.5% and 5.5% which is a reasonable range. For an unemployment rate of 5.5%, the total
output loss is 12.2% if ﬁrms can commit to their posted wages and 18.5% if they cannot.
In the latter case, there is excess vacancy creation due to a busines-stealing externality. If
ﬁrms can commit to wages, 60% of the output loss is due to sub-optimal assignment, 11%
is due to vacancy creation and 29% is due to unemployment. Traditionally, most of the
macro labor literature focussed on unemployment but those results imply that mismatch
is at least as important from an eﬃciency point of view.
Other contributions of our paper are that we show that the max-mean wage diﬀerential
is a more robust measure for wage dispersion than measures based on the reservation wage
because workers move towards the best jobs so the density around the highest wage is a
lot higher than around the lowest wage. We also discuss a simple and tractable method
for estimating the size of wage diﬀerentials allowing for measurement error. Finally, we
apply the theory of imperfect substitution between high and low-skilled workers. This
yields a relation between Katz and Murphy’s (1992) elasticity of substitution between
42high and low-skilled workers and the second derivative of the production function of our
model. This relation allows us to calculate the total output loss due to mismatch and
the corresponding unemployment rate that our model implies, for a given value of non
market time.
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46Appendix
A Derivations and proofs
A.1 Derivation of the asset values
The Bellman equation for the asset value of employment reads
ρV











E (x) − V
U 
. (34)





ρ + δ + 2ψλx
. (35)






ρ + δ + 2ψλz
dz + C0.












(ρ + δ + 2ψλz)
2dz + C0. (36)










Substitution of this equation into (36) yields the desired expression. Let ExW ≡
  ¯ x
0 g (x)W (x)dx
be the expected wage of a ﬁlled job. Evaluate (3) at   x and use the deﬁnition of g in (12)
to get
ρV
E(  x) = ρV
U =
W(z) + ψκ  xExW
1 + ψκ  x
=
uW(  x) + ψ (1 − u)ExW
u + ψ (1 − u)
. (37)





V E (x) − V U 
dx. Substitution of this expression into (2) gives ρV U
as a function of W(  x), which can be eliminated by solving (37) for W(  x). This gives
ρV
U =
B + κ  xExW
1 + κ  x
= uB + (1 − u)ExW, (38)
47where the ﬁnal step uses (11).
The free entry condition implies that the option value of a vacancy of type c must be
equal to K. Hence, by deﬁning ExY ≡
  x




{u + ψ (1 − u)[1 − G(x)]}
Y (x) − W(x)
ρ + δ + 2ψλx
dx
= (1 − u)(ExY − ExW).
The ﬁrst term in the integrand is the eﬀective labor supply, u + ψ (1 − u)[1 − G(x)] for
a vacancy of type x. It is equal to the number of unemployed, u plus the number of
workers employed in jobs with a mismatch indicator that exceeds x, (1 − u)[1 − G(x)].
The second factor is the discounted value of a ﬁlled vacancy. Just as in the wage equation,
we discount current revenue Y (x)−W (x) by the discount rate ρ plus the separation rate
δ plus the quit rate 2ψλx. The second line follows from substituting (11) and (12) in.
A.2 Variance of   x
Var[  x] =
  ￿ x
0
  x
2g (  x)d  x =
1 + ψ  x
  x
  ￿ x
0
  x2
(1 + ψ  x)
2d  x =
1 + ψ  x
ψ3  x










  x + 2
  x + 1






For the sake of convenience, we apply the version where κ is normalized to unity.
ufue = 2λ(1 − u),
(1 − u)fee = 2
  ￿ x
0
ψλ(1 − u)g (  x)  xd  x = 2ψλ(1 − u)
(1 + ψ  x)
ψ2  x





= 2λ(1 − u)
 
1 + ψ  x
ψ  x









1 + ψ  x
ψ  x
ln(ψ  x + 1) − 1
 
=
1 + ψ  x




48A.4 Wages and expected wages
commitment:
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,
  γ = (1 − B)
u + ψ(1 − u)
1
2  x2 − (1 − ψ)(1 − u) 3
ψ3￿ x
 
ψ  x + 1
2ψ2  x2 − (1 + ψ  x)ln(1 + ψ  x)
 .
where we ﬁrst apply change of variables, q = ψ  x, d  x = 1
ψdq and then repeatedly use
partial integration. The last equation follows from (6) and (7).
no commitment
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49where the last equation follows again from (6)and (7).. In all relations presented above,
  x can be eliminated using




compare equation (11), while   γ can be eliminated using (7).
A.5 Wage diﬀerentials and the output loss due to search for
ψ = 1
commitment
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In all these equations, we use equation (7) to eliminate   γ.
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